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Comments
Prepayments: The Historical Tension Between Tax
and Commercial Accounting
I. INTRODUCTION
It would be difficult to find another area in the tax field in which
the Commissioner has had as much early success at the expense of
good accounting practice, than in the area of prepaid income and
estimated future expenses. Originally, prepayments for the per-
formance of services or for the sale of goods were required to be
reported by an accrual method taxpayer in the year of the prepay-
ment, even though for purposes of non-tax accounting the amount
might have been deferred and not accrued until the services which
earned the payment were performed or the goods sold were deliv-
ered. In 1954, Congress in an attempt to reconcile the two posi-
tions, passed section .452 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,'
which would have permitted deferral of prepaid income over a five
year period, and section 4622 which would have permitted reserves
for certain estimated expenses. However, when it appeared that
the one time revenue loss from the enactment of these sections
might be in excess of one billion dollars,' largely because of unex-
pected reserves and lack of transitional rules, these sections were
retroactively repealed later in the same year. Subsequently, the
Supreme Court appeared to accept the traditional position held by
the government concerning prepayments, viewing the repeal of sec-
tions 452 and 462 as a Congressional ratification of the Commis-
sioner's long standing rule denying referral.'
1. I.R.C., Pub. L. No. 591, ch. 736, § 452, 68A Stat. 152 (1954), repealed by Act of
June 15, 1955, § l(a), Pub. L. No. 74, 69 Stat. 134.
2. I.R.C., Pub. L. No. 591, ch. 736, § 462, 68A Stat. 152 (1954), repealed by Act of
June 15, 1955, § l(b), Pub. L. No. 74, 69 Stat. 134.
3. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
4. Schlude v. Comm'r, 372 U.S. 128 (1963); American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367
U.S. 687 (1961); Automobile Club of Michigan v. Comm'r, 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
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More recent developments, however, indicated a possible weak-
ening of the Government's approach. In Artnell Co. v. Commis-
ioner,5 the Seventh Circuit held that a taxpayer would be permit-
ted to defer advance receipts where he could show with reasonable
certainty that they were to be earned by the performance of a par-
ticular service on a specific future date. This decision made it clear
that there were indeed situations in which deferral would be al-
lowed, and that the intimations to that effect in earlier Supreme
Court opinions were not merely meaningless dicta. Artnell
prompted the immediate promulgation of Revenue Procedure 70-
21,6 allowing deferral of prepayments for services under limited
circumstances, and Treasury Regulation 1.451-5,7 permitting defer-
ral of prepayments for the sale of goods according to the seller's
regular method of accounting.
Despite an apparent current truce in the battle between tax and
commercial accounting in the area of prepayments, many taxpay-
ers still choose to avoid the issue of prepayments altogether by
having any advance payments characterized as a loan or even as a
security deposit. Taxpayers also avoid prepayment problems
through the use of trusts or escrow accounts, artificial billing prac-
tices, or by adjusting their business cycle to coincide with their
fiscal year. It is not clear at this point as to whether the current
reconciliations in the struggle between tax and commercial ac-
counting in the area of advance payments and deferrals are a per-
manent end to the hostilities or merely a temporary cease fire.
This comment will discuss the historical tension between tax and
commercial accounting in the area of prepayments. This will be
done by describing the development of the problem and Congress'
attempt to deal with it legislatively in 1954. Next, the case law that
resulted from the repeal of sections 452 and 462 will be examined.
Finally, recent regulatory efforts in this area will be described, as
well as some practical alternatives presently employed by taxpay-
ers seeking to defer accrual of prepaid income.
II. TRADITIONAL APPROACH
The traditional rule has been that prepayments for goods or for
5. 400 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1968).
6. 1970-2 C.B. 501.
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5, T.D. 7397, 1976-1 C.B. 115.
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the performance of services must be reported by an accrual
method taxpayer in the year of the prepayment even though for
purposes of non-tax accounting the amount might be deferred and
not accrued until the goods are delivered or the services which
earned the payment are performed. The purpose of deferring pre-
paid income is to attribute that income to the period in which it is
earned. Similarly, the purpose of establishing reserves for esti-
mated future expenses is to match these expenses against the reve-
nues to which they relate. Both the deferral of prepaid income and
the establishment of reserves for estimated future expenses con-
form with generally accepted accounting principals."
The courts have recognized that since the underlying purpose for
deferring income and establishing future expenses is the same, i.e.,
the matching of revenues against expenses, the two concepts
should be governed by the same legal principles. Although it can
be argued that there are technical distinctions in deferring prepaid
income and deducting estimated future expenses, the net result is
the same' and for purposes of this comment all discussions con-
cerning the deferring of prepaid income will be applicable equally
to the related concept of reserving future expenses, unless other-
wise noted.
The Internal Revenue Code requires that taxable income be
computed using the method of accounting used by the taxpayer in
keeping his books.' 0 The purpose of the accrual method of ac-
counting is to match income and expenses in the period during
which they are earned and incurred, respectively." Actual receipt
of income or payment of expenses is generally irrelevant."2 Under
this system, income is recognized when "earned" by the perform-
8. See Rev. Proc. 71-21, 1971-2 C.B. 549 § 2.
9. Simplified Tax Records, Inc. v. Comm'r, 41 T.C. 75, 79 (1963). Accord, Field En-
ters. Inc. v. United States, 348 F.2d 485 (Ct. CL 1965).
10. I.R.C. § 446(a) (1976). The accrual method of accounting is recognized by the In-
ternal Revenue Code as a permissible method. Id. at § 446(c).
11. United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422 (1926); FINNEv & MILLER, PmNcIPLES OF
ACCOUNTING INTERMEDIATE 9-10 (1965).
12. Under the regulations, the timing of income and deductions are governed by the
"all events" test. Income is includable in gross income "when all events have occurred which
fix the right to receive income and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable
accuracy." Tress. Reg. § 1.451-1(a), T.D. 7397, 1976-1 C.B. 115. Expenses are deductible
when "all events have occurred which determine the fact of liability and the amount thereof




ance of services or delivery of goods, regardless of when payment is
actually received, and expenses are reported in the year in which
corresponding income is "earned," regardless of when the expendi-
tures are actually made."3 The matching of income and expenses
avoids the distortion that invariably arises under the simpler cash
receipts and disbursements method of accounting. Assume for ex-
ample, that a corporation received $10,000 in November, 1980, for
services to be performed, half in 1980 and half in 1981. Assume
further that the corporation incurred expenses of $8,000 in per-
forming these services and that all of these expenses were paid in
1981. Under the cash method the corporation would show a
$10,000 profit in 1980 and an $8,000 loss in 1981 even though its
true profit on the transaction is $1,000 in 1980 and $1,000 in
1981.14 Under the accrual method, the first half, or $5,000 earned
in 1980 is included in income for that year and the $5,000 balance
is deferred until 1981 when it is earned. In addition, although not
paid until 1981, a reserve of $4,000 for expenses to be incurred is
established in 1980. The remaining $4,000 of expense is deducted
in 1981 when it is incurred. Thus, the accrual method presents a
more accurate picture of the financial position of the corporation
as of any given date and also of the results of its operations for any
reporting period.
From the practical point of view, while both business and tax
accounting principles are designed to yield an annual net income
figure, their objectives are not identical. The business world wants
a periodic net income figure for purposes of determining profitabil-
13. There is much confusion concerning the use of the terms "earn," "realize," and
"recognize" in income tax accounting. Properly speaking, income is "earned" over the life of
a transaction by the continuing activity of performance of the contract; it is "realized" upon
completion of the transaction; and ordinarily it is then "recognized" immediately or at a
date depending upon the taxpayer's system of accounting. See Alvin, "Prepaid Income".
How The Commissioner Turned Liabilities into Income Under Section 446 of the 1954
Code, 11 WAYNE L. REv. 482, 494-95 (1965).
According to the above definitions, prepayments have been neither earned nor realized
at the time their receipt and should therefore not be considered income under § 61(a). How-
ever, the Commissioner contends that performance of the contract is not a condition prece-
dent to the realization of income, that prepayments constitute realized income, and that
they should therefore be recognized when received. Id. at 494-96. See Comment, Accrual
Accounting and the Clear Reflection of Income: Purity of Accounting Principals Forsaken
and the Protection of Tax Revenues, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 511 (1966). See also J. CHOMMIE,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 83 at 236 (2d ed. 1973); 2 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 12.60 (rev. perm. ed. 1967).
14. FINNEY & MILLER, supra note 11, at 9-10.
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ity for various accounting periods. On the other hand, Congress
wants a steady flow of tax revenue and assurance that taxpayers, in
fact, pay tax on all elements of gain, even if it may later be offset
by related expenses.
There has been considerable divergence between tax accounting
and commercial accounting in the treatment of advance payments
for services and sales of goods, and the use of reserves for esti-
mated expenses. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has long
taken the position that prepayments for services or for sales of
goods are income in the year of receipt to an accrual basis tax-
payer,1 5 regardless of when the services are to be performed or
when the delivery and passage of title to the goods is to take place.
Commercial accounting, however, would report this income only in
the year of performance or of delivery and passage of title.
For income tax purposes, the Commissioner and the courts have
primarily employed two techniques to disallow the use of the ac-
crual method of accounting to defer recognition of prepaid receipts
to the year when the services are performed or goods delivered.
These techniques are: (1) the "claim of right" doctrine, first pro-
pounded in North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet 6 and (2)
the "Commissioner's discretion" rule." The claim of right doctrine,
as enunciated by the Supreme Court in North American Oil
provides:
If a taxpayer received earnings under a claim of right and without restric-
tion as to its disposition, he has received income which he is required to
return, even though it might still be claimed that he is not entitled to retain
the money, and even though he may still be adjudged liable to restore its
equivalent. 8
Although the decision in North American Oil actually had noth-
15. See Chief Counsel's Memorandum 20,021, 1938-1 C.B. 157. The bulletin dealt with
the question of whether income received by the M Publishing Co. as payment for subscrip-
tions to periodicals may be reported as income for the years on which earned rather that in
the year of receipt. It was held that amounts received by the M Publishing Co. within the
taxable year without restriction as to disposition, use, or enjoyment, for subscription service
to be rendered in a succeeding year or years constitute income for the year in which received
regardless of the fact that the taxpayer's books of account are kept on the accrual basis.
16. 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
17. I.R.C. § 446(b) (1976). This section provides, in effect, that if a taxpayer's method
of accounting does not clearly reflect income, the computation shall be made in accordance
with such method as in the Commissioner's opinion does clearly reflect income.
18. 286 U.S. at 424.
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ing to do with advance payments and in fact involved money con-
ceded by the taxpayer to be income, 9 the doctrine was soon lifted
out of its limited context and was applied generally to characterize
prepayments for services as income in the year of receipt, recogniz-
able in that year for tax purposes, regardless of the taxpayer's ac-
counting method.20 The Commissioner's assertion of the claim of
right doctrine as a theory for taxing prepaid sales of goods, as op-
posed to services, was generally less successful. 2 In 1955, the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 2 and in 1959, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit2 3 expressly rejected the claim of right
doctrine as a technique for disallowing the deferral of prepayments
for services and the doctrine is now rarely found in decisions deal-
ing with deferral of prepayments.
The second technique used to deny deferral of prepayments is
the Commissioner's discretion rule. This is actually an exercise of
limited judicial review of determinations made by the Commis-
sioner that a taxpayer's accounting method does not "clearly re-
flect income. '2 4 A method of accounting means not only the overall
method, "but also the accounting treatment of any item" of in-
come or expense.25 It has been the Commissioner's position for
19. A section of oil land had been put into receivership while the right to its beneficial
ownership was being litigated by the oil company and the United States. Id. at 420-21. After
the district court had dismissed the government's petition, the income from the land previ-
ously held by the receiver was paid to the oil company. Id. at 421. The United States Su-
preme Court held that the income should have been recognized when paid by the receiver
under a claim of right, despite the fact that the government was still contesting the owner-
ship on appeal. Id. at 424.
20. See, e.g., Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193 (1934); South Dade Farms, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 138 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1943).
21. Veenestra & DeHaan Coal Co. v. Comm'r, 11 T.C. 964 (1948).
22. Beacon Publishing Co. v. Comm'r, 218 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1955) (court allowed
deferral of prepaid newspaper subscriptions by an accrual basis taxpayer on the theory that
application of the claim of right doctrine by the Commissioner would result in a "distortion
of an accrual taxpayer's true income" by creating a hybrid bookkeeping system in which the
accrual basis taxpayer reports all prepaid items on the cash receipts basis). Id. at 700-01.
23. Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Comm'r, 267 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1959) (court allowed deferral
of prepayments for future servicing of television sets by an accrual basis taxpayer, saying
*that the claim of right doctrine did not apply to "unearned receipts" and that taxpayer's
matching of receipts and expenditures clearly reflected income). Id. at 528. But see Ameri-
can Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 689 (1961).
24. I.R.C. § 446(b) (1976).
25. Treas. Rag. § 1.446-1(a)(1), T.D. 7285, 1973-2 C.B. 163. In Treas. Reg. § 1.446-
l(e)(2)(ii)(a), T.D. 7285, 1973-2 C.B. 163, the definition of "method of accounting" is refined
to include only treatment of any material item which involves the proper time for inclusion
of the item in income or the taking of a deduction.
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some time that amounts received for services to be performed in
the future must be fully included in gross income in the year of
receipt in order to reflect income clearly, despite the fact that this
treatment is not in accord with generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples.2 6 The Supreme Court has employed this device three times
to uphold the Commissioner's assessment: Automobile Club of
Michigan v. Commissioner,2 7 American Automobile Association v.
United States,8 and Schlude v. Commissioner.2 ' Although the
Commissioner had argued that the claim of right doctrine 0 should
be applied in these cases, the Court carefully avoided reliance upon
that theory and instead upheld the Commissioner's position by vir-
tue of the Commissioner's authority under section 446(b) to deter-
mine whether the taxpayer's accounting method clearly reflected
income,8 1 and found that the Commissioner had not abused this
discretion.
Although the Supreme Court was consistently able to rely on the
Commissioner's discretion pursuant to section 446 to determine
that a prepayment for services to be rendered in the future should
be accrued immediately and included in gross income in the year
of receipt, it is also section 446, as interpreted by the regulations,
which ironically offers the taxpayer the most direct authority for
deferring prepayments, particularly in a situation dealing with a
prepayment on the sale of goods.32 However, in Hagen Advertising
Displays, Inc.,'s the Tax Court held, and was later affirmed by the
Sixth Circuit," that advance payments for the sale of goods would
be considered income when received. This was held despite the
26. See supra note 14.
27. 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
28. 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
29. 372 U.S. 128 (1963). See infra notes 51-63 and accompanying text.
30. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
31. See supra notes 24, 25 and accompanying text.
32. Treas. Reg. § 446-1(c)(1)(ii), T.D. 7285, 1973-2 C.B. 163. This regulation states
that "the method used by the taxpayer in determining when income is to be accounted for
will be acceptable if it accords with generally accepted accounting principles, [and] is con-
sistently used by the taxpayer from year to year .... "Id. The regulation further states, by
way of example, that "a manufacturing business may account for sales of his product when
the goods are shipped, when the product is delivered or accepted, or when title to the goods
passes to the customer, whether or not billed depending upon the method regularly em-
ployed in keeping his books." Id.




taxpayer's contention that the advance payments constituted gross
receipts only and could not be considered gross income until the
cost of goods sold had been determined and deducted from gross
receipts."5
It was against this background of discrepancies between the
treatment of prepaid income under generally accepted principles of
accrual accounting and under tax accounting rules, as interpreted
by the court, that Congress, in an attempt to achieve some cer-
tainty in this area, incorporated sections 452 and 462 into the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954.1"
III. SECTIONS 452 AND 462
The enactment of sections 452 and 462 of the 1954 Internal Rev-
enue Code was an attempt by Congress to bring tax accounting
concepts into line with generally accepted commercial accounting
concepts in cases of prepayments for goods or services (section
452) and the use of reserves for estimated expenses (section 462).17
Section 452, which applied to an accrual basis trade or business
that received prepaid income in connection with a liability to
render services or furnish goods, permitted the prepaid income to
be included in the year in which it was received and in each of the
five succeeding taxable years.38 The section defined prepaid income
as "any amount (includable in gross income) which is received in
connection with, and is directly attributable to a liability which ex-
tends beyond the close of the taxable year in which such amount is
received."3 9 The term prepaid income, however, did not expressly
include any amounts that were "treated as gain from the sale or
other disposition of a capital asset, ' 40 whether long term or short
35. Id.
36. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong. 2d Seas. 62 (1954).
37. Id.
38. I.R.C., Pub. L. No. 591, ch. 736, § 452, 68A Stat. 152 (1954), repealed by Act of
June 15, 1955, § l(a), Pub. L. No. 74, 69 Stat. 134 provided:
In the case of any prepaid income to which this section applies, if the liability ... is
... to end before the first day of the sixth taxable year in which such income is
received, then such income shall be included in gross income for the taxable year in
which it is received, and for each of the five succeeding taxable years, to the extent
proper under the method of accounting used under section 446 in computing taxable
income for such year.




term. A liability was defined as "a liability to render services, fur-
nish goods or other property, or allow the use of property."'
Although the enactment of sections 452 and 462 was looked
upon with favor by most tax practitioners," critics pointed out
that the revenue to be lost as a result of the enactment of the sec-
tions might be astronomical. The original estimates, made in 1954,
of the loss in revenue from the provisions of sections 452 and 462
was $45,000,000 for the fiscal year 1955. In the early part of 1955,
however, revised estimates indicated that the revenue loss might
be as high as several billion dollars.'3 It also appeared that the two
sections were being interpreted by taxpayers as extending far be-
yond the operation intended and expected by the Treasury at the
time of their adoption. In response to this anticipated revenue loss
and the Treasury Department's belief that the two sections as they
were enacted could not be corrected by regulations, the Treasury
strongly recommended that Congress retroactively repeal both
sections."
The Secretary of the Treasury in a letter to the House Commit-
tee on Ways and Means indicated "that the repeal of sections 452
and 462 should operate simply to re-establish the principles of law
which would have been applicable if sections 452 and 462 had
never been enacted."'4 5 However, the Senate Finance Committee, in
reporting on the repeal of these sections expressed their concern
that the repeal of these sections would not solve the problems in
this area:
Your committee desires to make its position clear that it expects to report
out legislation dealing with prepaid income and reserves for estimated ex-
penses at an early date. . . . [T]he existing rulings of the Treasury Depart-
ment and the court decisions dealing with estimated expenses and prepaid
income are now in such a state of confusion and uncertainty that in the
opinion of your committee legislative action is required on these subjects. In
addition, your committee believes that it is essential that the income tax
laws be brought into harmony with generally -accepted accounting principles
41. Id. § 452(e)(2).
42. See Bierman & Helstein, Accounting for Prepaid Income and Estimated Ex-
penses Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 10 TAx L. REv. 83 (1954).
43. Id.
44. H. REP. No. 293, 84th Cong. 1st Sess. (1955) [hereinafter H. REP. No. 293], re-
printed in 1955-2 C.B. 852; S. REP. No. 372, 84th Cong. 1st Seas. (1955) [hereinafter S. REP.
No. 372], reprinted in 1955-2 C.B. 858.
45. H. ReP. No. 293, supra note 44, at 855.
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... . [Diefinite rules must be written into the income tax laws."'
Congress acted in 1955 to repeal both sections 452 and 462 on a
retroactive basis,47 and included provisions as to the steps taxpay-
ers had to take with respect to returns in which they had elected
the benefits of either section 452 or section 462 or both and were
now faced with increased tax liability due to their retroactive re-
peal.48 Despite the fact that the Secretary of the Treasury, who
proposed the repeal of these sections,4" and the report of the Sen-
ate Finance Committee 0 both made it explicitly clear that no in-
ference of disapproval of accrual accounting principles was to be
drawn from the repeal of these sections, it will be seen in the next
section of this comment that the Supreme Court of the United
States would take the position that the enactment and subsequent
repeal of sections 452 and 462 evidenced a Congressional intent to
which the Court would defer, i.e., that any deferral of prepaid in-
come was precluded unless specifically authorized by Congress.
IV. CASE LAW
The starting point for an examination of the current treatment
of advance payments for services and for sales of goods would have
to be those cases referred to collectively as the "trilogy" of Su-
preme Court cases: Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commis-
sioner,'5 1 American Automobile Association v. United States,5" and
Schlude v. Commissioner.5 -
In Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner (Auto Club)
the taxpayer kept its books on the accrual basis and deferred pre-
paid annual dues to each of the twelve succeeding months, al-
46. S. REP. No. 372, supra note 44.
47. Act of June 15, 1955, Pub. L. No. 74, 69 Stat. 134.
48. Id. § 4 entitled "Saving Provisions" applied when the repeal of either section 452
or section 462 increased the tax of a taxpayer and when: (1) the tax was for a taxable year
ending on or before June 15, 1955 (the date of the enactment of the repealing act); and (2)
the last date prescribed for the payment of the tax or installment thereof was before Decem-
ber 15, 1955. The taxpayer had to file, on or before December 15, 1955, a statement showing
the increase in the amount of tax. If the taxpayer filed the required statement and also paid
in full that portion of the increase in tax which was due before December 15, 1955, the
taxpayer would not be liable for the payments of interest on the increase in tax. Id.
49. See supra note 45.
50. See supra note 46.
51. 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
52. 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
53. 372 U.S. 128 (1963).
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though it used the payments without restriction. The dues entitled
the member to various services provided by the club on the mem-
bers' demand. 4 Although the Commissioner argued for rejection of
the deferral under the claim of right doctrine," the Court carefully
avoided relying on that theory and eventually upheld the Commis-
sioner's position using the Commissioner's discretion rule.5" The
Supreme Court observed that the auto clubs were unable to show
precisely when the receipts from each member would be earned.
Even though general accounting principles would have permitted
deferral on the basis of an estimate or a statistical analysis of
member utilization of the organization's services, the lack of preci-
sion in matching income and expenses led the Court to sustain the
Commissioner."1
In American Automobile Association v. United States (A.A.A.)
under similar circumstances the Court again upheld the Commis-
sioner, despite expert testimony that the method used to allocate
the dues receipts to the months of the membership was in accord
with generally accepted accounting principles. The Court found,
with four dissents, that the matching of revenues and the corre-
sponding expenses of performing services was imprecise and there-
fore not permissible."e The Court could not say that the Commis-
sioner had abused his broad discretion by rejecting the taxpayer's
system. Also, the Court in A.A.A. relied on the legislative history of
sections 452 and 462."' It believed that since these sections had
sanctioned precisely what these taxpayers were asserting, and since
they were retroactively repealed only one year after enactment,
Congress had rejected the method of accounting utilized by these
54. 353 U.S. at 189-90.
55. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
57. The Court noted:
It may be true that to the accountant the actual incidence of cost in serving an indi-
vidual member in exchange for his individual dues is inconsequential, or, from the
viewpoint of commercial accounting, unessential to determination and disclosure of
the overall financial condition of the Association. That 'irregularity,' however, is high-
ly relevant to the clarity of an accounting system which defers receipt, as earned
income, of dues to a taxable period in which no, some, or all of the services paid for
by those dues may or may not be rendered.
367 U.S. at 692.
58. Id. at 693-98.
59. Id. See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
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taxpayers.6 0 Moreover, the Court noted that after the decision in
Auto Club, Congress enacted section 45561 which permits deferral
of prepaid subscription income and rejected a section which would
have permitted deferral of prepaid dues to non-profit service orga-
nizations pending further study.6 2 The decision is a reaffirmation
of the decision in Auto Club based on the Commissioner's discre-
tion rule and the notion, based on the legislative history of sections
452 and 462, that if Congress has not expressly sanctioned deferral,
then it is precluded.
The third part of the trilogy, Schlude v. Commissioner, con-
cerned the attempt by partners in a dance studio to defer prepay-
ments for dancing lessons. The Supreme Court, again with four
dissents, held that the taxpayer could not defer recognition of in-
come on prepaid receipts for dancing lessons since "services were
rendered solely on demand in the fashion of the American Auto-
mobile Association and Automobile Club of Michigan cases." ' s
It seems clear that this trilogy of Supreme Court cases stands for
the principle that prepaid income may not be deferred and esti-
mated expenses deducted in those situations where the basis for
deferral or deduction is purely artificial, i.e., where the time when
the income will be earned or the expenses incurred cannot be pre-
cisely determined. In these situations the Commissioner is fully au-
thorized under section 446(b) of the code to adjust the taxpayer's
60. 367 U.S. at 695. The court in A.A.A. stated:
[Tihe fact is that § 452 for the first time specifically declared petitioner's system of
accounting to be acceptable for income tax purposes, and overruled the long-standing
position of the Commissioner and courts to the contrary. And the repeal of the sec-
tion the following year, upon insistence by the Treasury that the proposed endorse-
ment of such tax accounting would have a disastrous impact on the Government's
revenue, was just as clearly a mandate from the Congress that petitioner's system was
not acceptable for tax purposes.
Id.
61. I.R.C. § 455 (1976). Prepaid subscription income was defined as "any amount
which is received in connection with, and is directly attributable to, a liability which extends
beyond the close of the taxable year in which such amount is received, and which is income
from a subscription to a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical." Id. at § 455(d)(1).
62. • After the decision in American Auto. Ass'n, Congress enacted I.R.C. § 456 (1976)
permitting deferral of prepaid dues by certain membership organizations and thus strength-
ened the legislative history argument against deferral.
63. 372 U.S. at 136. See Behren, Schlude Holds Prepaid Income Taxable on "Re-
ceipt", Rationale is Uncertain, 18 J. TAx'N 194 (1963). The Court also stated that it re-
garded the retroactive appeal of § 452 "as reinstating long-standing administrative and
lower court rulings that accounting systems deferring prepaid income could be rejected by
the Commissioner." 372 U.S. at 134.
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method of accounting in order to "clearly reflect income." It
should also be noted that these decisions dealt only with situations
involving prepayments for the rendition of future services and did
not consider the situation presented by the prepayment of part or
all of the purchase price of goods to be sold and delivered in the
future. However, the decisions were eventually extended well be-
yond their original scope and were used to disallow deferral of ad-
vance payments for the sale of goods, too."
In the face of such consistent success by the Commissioner in
rejecting deferral of prepaid income, the Seventh Circuit rendered
its decision in Artnell Co. v. Commissioner,66 and permitted defer-
ral. There, the taxpayer owned a professional baseball team and
received advance payments for tickets, parking books and broad-
casting rights for the ensuing baseball season. When owned by Chi-
cago White Sox Incorporated, the taxpayer had used the accrual
method of accounting and the tax year normally would have ended
on October 31, 1962. However, because of the liquidation following
the purchase of all of the White Sox stock by Artnell Company,
the tax year ended on May 31, 1962, when only thirty-one percent
of the scheduled home games had been played. The White Sox bal-
ance sheet showed as deferred "unearned income" 66 that part of
the advance receipts allocable to later games. Artnell included in
its tax return for May 31, 1962, only the receipts shown as "earned
income" on its books. The Commissioner assessed a deficiency and
the Tax Court upheld it.""
Relying on its own prior decisions 8 and those reached earlier by
64. Hagen Advertising Displays, Inc. v. Comm'r, 47 T.C. 139 (1966), aff'd, 407 F.2d
1105 (6th Cir. 1969); Farrara v. Comm'r, 44 T.C. 189 (1965); Modernaire Interiors, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 27 T.C.M. 1334 (1960); Fifth & New York Co. v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 421
(W.D. Ky. 1964).
65. 400 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1968).
66. Chicago White Sox, Inc., had established a system of accounting where prepay-
ments were put into an "unearned income" account, a portion of the payments being trans-
ferred to an "earned income" account as each game was played. In this way receipts were
consistently matched with revenues. Id. at 982-83.
67. Artnell Co. v. Comm'r, 48 T.C. 411 (1967), rev'd, 400 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1968).
68. 48 T.C. at 416. The Tax Court in discussing the three Supreme Court decisions
regarding deferral of prepaid income stated that: "Notwithstanding the Court's criticism of
the methods of accounting used by the taxpayers in those cases, we believe that the Court
would reach the same result without regard to the method used by the taxpayer for defer-
ring prepaid income." Id.
1982
Duquesne Law Review
the Supreme Court,69 the Tax Court determined that the Commis-
sioner had not abused his discretion under section 446(b) in re-
jecting the deferral of prepaid income by Artnell, regardless of the
method used by Artnell Company to defer it.70 On appeal, the Sev-
enth Circuit reversed the Tax Court, stating that there was no rule
of tax law which required automatic inclusion of prepaid income.
Rather, it must first be determined that the taxpayer's method of
accounting does not clearly reflect income, and only in that event
may the Commissioner recompute according to his own discre-
tion.71 Because the Tax Court had denied deferral to Artnell Com-
pany without first determining whether their accounting method
clearly reflected income, the case was remanded.7 On remand, the
Tax Court observed that the schedule of baseball games permitted
an exact forecast of Artnell's earnings and held that while the tax-
payer's accounting method was not ideal, the taxpayer did act
properly in deferring income allocable to games played after the
end of the tax year.7
As a result of the case law in the area of deferring prepaid in-
come, an accrual method taxpayer was required to include advance
payments in income when received unless he either fell within a
specific statutory exception or was able to predict precisely the
time when the earning event would occur. 4 It was against this
background that on August 6, 1970, the Internal Revenue Service
published News Release 1055, which announced that comprehen-
69. See supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text.
70. A careful reading of I.R.C. § 446(b) (1976) indicates that the court had erroneously
interpreted the extent of the discretionary authority conferred upon the Commissioner.
That secton provides: "[I]f the method of accounting used does not clearly reflect income,
the computation of taxable income shall be made under such method as, in the opinion of
the Secretary, does clearly reflect income." Id. The clear import of the section is that the
Commissioner's discretion attaches only after the method of accounting has been deter-
mined not to clearly reflect income.
71. I.R.C. § 446(b) (1976). See supra note 70.
72. Artnell Co. v. Comm'r, 400 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1968). See Artnell Co., on remand,
29 T.C.M. (CCH) 403 (1970).
73. Auto Club., A.A.A. and Schlude are distinguishable from Artnell, for in those
cases it had been determined that income was not clearly reflected due to the taxpayer's
inability to match precisely income and the services by which the income was earned. See
supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text.
74. See Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 530 F.2d 1367 (Ct. Cl. 1976), cert. de-
nied 429 U.S. 867 (1976), in which the Court of Claims allowed an accrual method taxpayer
in the construction business to defer prepaid income for services where the services were to
be rendered at taxpayer's, not recipient's, discretion. The result is of questionable validity.
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sive rules would be issued recognizing an accrual basis taxpayer's
right to defer the reporting of advance payments as income. The
release stated that this represented a change from the Service's
past position. The new rules regarding advance receipts for ser-
vices were published in Revenue Procedure 70-21,"5 and those re-
lating to advance payments received for sales of goods for future
delivery were contained in Proposed Regulation 1.451-5.76
V. REVENUE PROCEDURE 70-21 AND TREASURY
REGULATION 1.451-5
The government did not petition for certiorari in ArtneU. More-
over, since that decision, the promulgation of Revenue Procedure
70-21 concerning prepayment for services, and Regulation 1.451-5,
relating to prepayments for goods, reflect a kind of hesitant and
creeping move toward the adoption of business accounting
principles.
Deferral of advance payments received for services will be per-
mitted under Revenue Procedure 70-21, if the services are required
by written or oral agreement to be performed completely by the
end of the following taxable year. The payment is to be included in
income in the taxable year in which it is earned, i.e., the service
actually performed, but in no case will it be included later than the
taxable year following the year of receipt. Even if the services are
not in fact performed within the period required, all prepaid in-
come allocable to the unperformed services must be included in
gross income in the year following the year of receipt, although a
portion of the payment is still unearned." If under the terms of
the agreement any portion of the services are to be performed after
the year following the year of receipt of an advance payment, or if
there is no specified date for the completion of services, then all
advance payments must be included when received.78
The revenue procedure contains provisions intended to prevent
75. 1970-2 C.B. 501, superseded by Rev. Proc. 71-21, 1971-2 C.B. 549 which provides
essentially the same rules.
76. 35 Fed. Reg. 12,612 (1970).
77. Rev. Proc. 70-21, 1970-2 C.B. 501, § 3.02.
78. Id. § 3.03. It appears also that an existing agreement may be modified to meet the
requirements of Rev. Proc. 70-21. Whether an agreement satisfies the provisions of Rev.
Proc. 70-21 is determined by examining the agreement "as it exists at the end of the taxable
year of receipt." Id. § 3.02.
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taxpayer avoidance of its limitations. The requirement that all the
services pursuant to an agreement must be performed before the
end of the taxable year following receipt of an advance payment
may not be avoided by dividing an agreement which spans a num-
ber of taxable years into several shorter agreements. The revenue
procedure provides that the term "agreement" includes other
agreements between the taxpayer and the person for whom the
services are to be performed if such other agreements "provide for
the rendition of substantially similar performance over a period of
time that is substantially consecutive to that of the first agree-
ment. '"79 Nor can the limitations of the revenue procedure be
avoided by having an affiliate perform services and obtain deferral
when the taxpayer could not have obtained such treatment. The
revenue procedure states that the term "taxpayer" includes an-
other person "if the taxpayer and such other person are owned or
controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests ....
The newly permitted deferrals will be treated as an acceptable
method of accounting under section 446 as long as the method is
consistently used by the taxpayer. Taxpayers may change to the
new method for either goods or services for any taxable year by
filing form 3115 within 180 days after the beginning of the year,81
and obtaining the consent of the Commissioner. Taxpayers already
using this method may continue to do so without the Commis-
sioner's consent.82 By treating the new rules as a method of ac-
counting, the Treasury has sought to avoid the large transitional
revenue losses envisioned under repealed section 452. If an accrual
basis taxpayer had been including advance payments in income as
they were received and now desires to change to one of the new
methods under either Revenue Procedure 70-21 or Treasury Regu-
lation 1.451-5 permitting limited deferrals, such amounts must be
included in income again under the new method as they are
earned. This duplication results in an increase in taxable income in
the year of change which may be deducted ratably over the year of
79. Id. § 3.07.
80. Id. § 3.08. Control here has the same meaning as in I.R.C. § 482 (1976), i.e., de
facto control. See Eustice, Tax Problems Arising From Transactions Between Affiliated or
Controlled Corporations, 23 TAX L. REv. 451, 486-89 (1968).
81. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(e), 3 T.D. 7285, 1973-2 C.B. 163.
82. Rev. Proc. 70-21, 1970-2 C.B. 501, § 3.12.
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change and the next nine years.8
These transitional rules will minimize the impact of revenue
losses from the new rulings.8" However, this impact is still felt
where a new taxpayer is involved, i.e., one who has not previously
included prepayments in income so as not to be liable for inclusion
of a duplicate amount when earned under the new method of ac-
counting. Possible avoidance of this duplicate tax has caused tax-
payers to maneuver to become artifically equivalent to a new tax-
payer. For instance, a taxpayer might endeavor to dispose of all his
obligations under previous service contracts during year one prior
to electing the new method for year two. This might be done by
either renegotiating the contracts with customers so as to end lia-
bility on the old contract during the year, ol by paying a third
party to service the contract prior to electing. Under such circum-
stances the Service can refuse to consent to changes of method
where the taxpayer has maneuvered to avoid the impact of the
transition rule. Alternatively the Service might conditionally con-
sent to the change of method upon inclusion of a phantom double-
reported amount equal to that which would have resulted if the
taxpayer had not assigned his obligations."
Although the new rules regarding advance receipts for services
were published in Revenue Procedure 70-21, the new rules relating
to advance payments received for sales of goods for future delivery
were contained in the Proposed Regulation 1.451-5. Under this sec-
tion the taxpayer has an election to include the advance payments
for sale of goods either in full in the taxable year of receipt or to
include them in the year when they would otherwise be properly
accruable under his method of accounting, i.e., when the goods are
shipped.8 This latter option is often referred to as the "book"
83. Id. § 5 provides that the Commissioner would apply the principles of Rev. Proc.
64-16, 1964-1 (pt. 1) C.B. 677, when considering requests for consents to change to the ac-
counting method permitted by the revenue procedure. Rev. Proc. 64-16 generally permitted
a change of accounting method when the taxpayer agreed to spread the adjustments over a
ten-year period. Id.
84. In another attempt to avoid a substantial revenue loss, Rev. Proc. 70-21 at § 3.06
specifically provides that it is not applicable to prepaid interest or prepaid rent. However,
Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of New York v. United States, 585 F.2d 988 (Ct. Cl. 1978) allowed
an accrual method taxpayer to defer the inclusion of prepaid interest from his gross income.
It was argued that there was no distortion of income because of the de minimus nature of
the prepaid interest deferred. Id. at 997.
85. Rev. Proc. 64-16, 1964-1 (pt. 1) C.B. 677.
86. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5(b)(1), T.D. 7397, 1976-1 C.B. 115.
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method. The regulation contains an exception8 7 to the otherwise
unqualified option given taxpayers to report advance payments on
their "book" method of accounting. This complex exception ap-
plies to a taxpayer who: (1) receives an advance payment with re-
spect to an agreement for sale of goods held primarily for sale to
customers; (2) by the last day of the tax year has received "sub-
stantial payments"; and (3) has, on hand, goods in sufficient quan-
tity to satisfy the agreement in that year. 8 If these conditions are
met, all advance payments received by the taxpayer by the last day
of the second taxable year following the year of receipt of the sub-
stantial advance payments must be included in income in the sec-
ond year. Unless the taxpayer falls within the "substantial advance
payment/goods on hand" exception, the regulation permits sub-
stantially unlimited deferral of reporting of advance payments for
the sale of goods until the time when the taxpayer would normally
account for those advance payments under his regular book
method of accounting.
89
To prevent deferred amounts from escaping inclusion indefi-
nitely, the regulation provides that any taxpayer using the "book"
method who dies, ceases to exist in a transaction, or whose liability
under the agreement otherwise ends, must include in the taxable
year of the event so much of the advance payments as have not
been included in all preceeding taxable years.'0 A taxpayer electing
the "book" method is required to attach to his return for each tax-
able year in which he received advance payments a schedule re-
flecting: (1) the total amount of advance payments received in the
year; (2) the total amount of advance payments received in prior
taxable years not included in income in those years; and (3) the
total amount of advance payments received in prior years which
are included in gross income for the current year. 1
If services are to be performed in conjunction with the sale of
goods, the regulations still apply if the performance of the services
87. Id. § 1.451-5(c)(1)(i).
88. Id. § 1.451-5(c)(3). A taxpayer will be considered to have received substantial pay-
ments where advance payments received with respect to an agreement which together with
all advance payments received prior to the taxable year with respect to the agreement, equal
or exceed the total cost reasonably estimated as includable in inventory with respect to the
agreement. Id.
89. Id. § 1.451-5(b)(1).
90. Id. § 1.451-5(0.
91. Id. § 1.451-5(d).
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is an integral part of the sale. ' If the amount allocable to payment
for services is less than five percent of the total price, the service
obligation will automatically be considered an integral part of the
sale of the goods.93
Thus far, this comment has dealt primarily with the historical
development of the concept of "deferring" advance receipts for
goods or services. It will now examine other possible techniques or
methods of avoiding or easing the problems of prepayments for
goods or services.
VI. ALTERNATIVES
Despite Revenue Procedure 70-21, Treasury Regulation 1.451-5,
and the ramifications of the Artnell decision," there is only one
sure method of avoiding the assertion of a tax on the receipt of
prepaid sales-do not accept any prepayments. More often than
not, though, not accepting prepayments is not a sound business
practice. Often a taxpayer will find he is able to advantageously
invest or otherwise beneficially utilize funds generated by prepay-
ments, despite the tax problems associated with them. Further,
many times a buyer is seeking an early deduction for his advance
payment. This is particularly true where the buyer is a cash basis
taxpayer. In the case of an accrual basis buyer, contracts should be
drawn to fulfill the all-events test.95 This will permit the buyer to
accrue a deduction without the necessity of making a payment.
If sound business prudence should dictate that prepayments
under a given set of circumstances are necessary, it may be possi-
ble to frame or characterize the transaction so as to avoid taxation
of the prepayments. Often it will be possible for the taxpayer to
characterize the prepayment as either a loan or a security deposit.
Characterization as a loan is preferable to characterization as a de-
posit in that borrowed funds are not considered income and are
not considered payment, even though the taxpayer has un-
restricted use of the funds." Characterization as a security deposit
may be considered to avoid treatment as a prepayment if the tax-
92. Id. § 1.451-5(a)(2).
93. Id. § 1.451-5(a)(3).
94. See supra note 65-70 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 12.
96. Summit Coal Co. v. Comm'r, 18 B.T.A. 983 (1930). However, the I.R.S. may at-
tempt to deny the reality of the loan. See Rev. Rul. 69-359, 1969-1 C.B. 140.
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payer is willing to forego use of the funds and hold them in trust
and not use them for his own benefit."
In Hagen Advertising Displays, Inc. v. Commissioner,9" a Sixth
Circuit court declined to treat an advance receipt as a loan or de-
posit, as had been done in the earlier Tax Court decison of Veen-
stra & DeHaan Coal Co.,"9 and in the Seventh Circuit court deci-
sion in Consolidated-Hammer Dry Plate & Film Co. v.
Commissioner.100 The Veenstra & DeHaan case involved a coal
company which received prepayments which were treated as a se-
curity deposit. The deposit was applied against the future
purchase of coal. The price was to be the market price on delivery
and the deposit was subject to refund if delivery could not be
made for any reason. The taxpayer co-mingled the deposits with
his general funds. The Consolidated-Hammer case involved a
manfuacturer who received prepayments which were treated by the
parties as a loan. The Air Force made advance payments for both
completed and uncompleted work on the constructon of a special
camera, and the manufacturer did not have any right to the ad-
vanced sums, i.e., it was refundable to the Air Force. The advances
were not required, but had been contemplated as a means of
financing the taxpayer's small manufacturing operation. The court
noted similarities to government small business loans. The fact
that title passed as payments were made was viewed as though the
government had a security lien. In both Consolidated-Hammer
and Veenstra & DeHaan, the courts found that the monies ad-
vanced were not taxable when received.
In Hagen, however, the Tax Court held that the advance pay-
ments in question were taxable in the year of receipt. The taxpayer
in Hagen was an accrual-basis manufacturer of identification signs
for national advertisers. Its customers placed blanket orders for
the number of signs which they estimated they would need for the
ensuing year, and during that year, from time to time, directed the
taxpayer to deliver signs. Although most of the customers did not
normally make advance payments, some customers asked to be
billed for their blanket order prior to. delivery. Also, when a blan-
ket order had been outstanding for an extended period of time, the
97. Angelus Funeral Home v. Comm'r, 407 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1969).
98. 47 T.C. 139 (1966), afj'd, 407 F.2d 1105 (6th Cir. 1969).
99. 11 T.C. 964 (1948).
100. 317 F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1963).
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customer was billed to induce a request for delivery. The taxpayer
recognized income from sales, including prepaid sales, only in the
year of delivery, and there was no allocation of inventory costs be-
tween signs made for customers who made advance payments and
customers who did not. Hagen argued that under its accrual
method of accounting, it realized income only when a sale was
completed, i.e., when title or possession passed .to the customer,
and that although the advance payments might constitute gross re-
ceipts, they were not gross income until the cost of goods sold had
been determined and deducted from gross receipts. The Tax
Court, after finding that the advance payments were received by
Hagen without restriction or disposition (a claim of right argu-
ment), held that the advance payments were taxable in the year of
receipt. The court discounted the taxpayer's reliance on the gross
receipts/gross income argument by pointing out that no records
were kept of the cost of goods for which advance deposits had been
received and that, therefore, no such deduction could be allowed.101
In Hagen, the prepayments were non-refundable and apparently
the price was fixed or determinable with some accuracy. The con-
dition of refundability would seem to be the significant difference
between the cases. The possibility of repayments makes the trans-
action lack the finality that tends to be associated with the concept
of includable income. Even so, to best come within the rule of
Veenstra & DeHaan, it seems the more factors left contingent the
better. Likewise, the rule of Consolidated-Hammer will require
that the transaction involve a loan. Hagen seems properly distin-
guishable from Veenstra & DeHaan and Consolidated-Hammer in
that there was no necessity for a refund, nor was there the appear-
ance of a loan.
In light of these circumstances, it appears that in order to be
more certain of characterization as a loan, such a transaction
should be framed and labeled as a loan. Further, the loan should
101. In a well reasoned dissent, Judge Hoyt argued that taxpayer's method of account-
ing was in fact a more accurate reflection of its income than the Commissioner's adjust-
ments, and that by failing to allow deferral in the advance payment for sales of goods area,
the court was taxing gross receipts and not gross income. The dissent points out that the
advance payments were not "gains" from sales until the cost of goods sold was deducted
from the amounts received, and until such time, taxpayer realized no gross income, as de-
fined in § 61. In addition, the dissent suggests that taxation of gross receipts would be an




be subject to repayment whether the goods are delivered or not, if
this is practical. The existence of at least nominal interest would
go a long way towards establishing the substance of the transaction
as a loan.
Characterizing a transaction as a security deposit is generally
more uncertain and generally less desirable. The Internal Revenue
Service's position is that a deposit that guarantees the customers
"payment" of amounts owed to a creditor is not a deposit but an
advance payment, while a deposit that secures someone's "prop-
erty" is a true security deposit and not an advance payment.102
The terms "deposit" and "advance" are so ambiguous that in
many cases it will be difficult to identify the transaction as an ad-
vance or a deposit. For example, a security deposit may be charac-
terized as an advance rental 03 and, as such, be taxable. 104 Most
importantly characterizations can not be made in a vacuum, and
the business needs of both the buyer and the seller must be satis-
fied in any commercial transaction. The buyer may need payment
to get an early deduction or the seller may be fearful of leaving the
buyer with an opportunity to back out of the deal with a refund by
not characterizing the advance as a prepayment.
If under the surrounding circumstances it becomes absolutely
necessary to accept a prepayment, one of the simplest devices for
avoiding the inherent problems of receiving advance payments is
to choose a fiscal year which coincides with the business cycle, so
that payment, at the beginning of a season and the subsequent
performance throughout the season all fall within one taxable year.
Since prepayments are injurious to the taxpayer only when they
are outstanding at the end of the year, an accounting period that
matches revenue over the year avoids the problem. This device is
particularly useful in a seasonal business. The Artnell case could
have been avoided if a tax year corresponding to the end of the
baseball season could have been arranged. °5 The selection of a
proper accounting period is best solved in the initial year of a busi-
ness. After that, the government's consent must be obtained before
102. Rev. Rul. 75-519, 1972-2 C.B. 32.
103. Gilken Corp. v. Comm'r, 176 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1949).
104. New Capital Hotel, Inc., 28 T.C. 706 (1957), aff'd per curiam, 261 F.2d 437 (6th
Cir. 1958).
105. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
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a change in accounting is allowed.""
Another technique for avoiding the problems of prepayment is
to adopt an artificial billing practice. The taxpayer should accept
prepayments for services only through the end of the current tax
year. Every customer should then be billed for a full year renewal
on the first day of the next tax year. Under Revenue Procedure 70-
21 this could be done in two year increments. The taxpayer could
accept payments only for services to be rendered through the end
of the next taxable year, soliciting renewals from each customer for
two year contracts beginning on the first day of the tax year fol-
lowing expiration of their first agreement."'
Finally, the use of escrow devices to delay receipt of a prepay-
ment is a possible solution, but the government seems opposed to
allowing the use of escrows in this manner.0 8 However, as men-
tioned earlier, a trust can be used to defer income if the taxpayer
is effectively foreclosed from control of the funds. Such a device
might not only delay receipt of the prepayment by the taxpayer,
but will also allow his buyer an early deduction.' 09
It would appear that, with the passage of Revenue Proceduure
70-21 allowing deferral on advance payments for services for up to
two years, and the passage of Treasury Regulation 1.451-5 allowing
deferral on prepayments for goods consistent with the taxpayer's
regular accounting method, there is finally a degree of certainty in
this historically turbulent tax accounting area. However, it must be
remembered that the tension in this area was presumably eased
twice before only to be subsequently rekindled: once with the pas-
sage of sections 452 and 462 of the Internal Revenue Code and
their almost immediate repeal, and later when the scope and appli-
cability of the Supreme Court's decisions in Auto Club, A.A.A.,
and Schlude were rendered uncertain by the decision in Artnell* In
lieu of the tumultuous past in the area of advance payments, it is
difficult to imagine that the current reconciliation in this area
106. I.R.C. § 442 (1976).
107. See Decisions, Inc. v. Comm'r, 47 T.C. 58 (1966).
108. Rev. Rul. 65-141, 1965-1 C.B. 210.
109. Angelus Funeral Home v. Comm'r, 407 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1968). The court noted
that the outcome in each case will turn on the provisions of the particular trust involved.
The control by, and the instrument of benefits to, the taxpayer are of prime importance. Id.
at 212.
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between tax and commercial accounting is anything more than the
proverbial calm before the next storm.
David C. Long
